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Reconciling productive agricultural practices with nature conservation is not only an ecological
challenge, but also a demanding matter of governance. This paper analyses the potential as well
as the limitations of various governance arrangements, and explores ways to enhance the
governance of nature conservation in agricultural landscapes. We assume four conditions to
contribute to the performance of these arrangements: farmers should be motivated,
demanded, enabled, and legitimized to participate in arrangements that promote nature
conservation by farmers. We analyse 10 distinct Dutch governance arrangements in the
period 2000–2016, including agri-environment schemes but also privately initiated
arrangements. The arrangements target a large but unknown share of farmers and farmlands,
but nature conservation ambition levels are generally low to moderate. The expected low-to-
moderate performance is associated with a low-to-moderate motivation, demand, and ability.
Underlying are stronger forces driving towards intensiﬁcation and problems farmers face in
recuperating the cost of nature conservation. New greening requirements in the EU
Common Agricultural Policy and in agri-food supply chains are ﬁrst, cautious steps
addressing these fundamental drivers of ecological degradation. More ambitious greening
requirements may contribute to a higher motivation and ability of larger groups of farmers
to implement nature conservation measures.
Keywords: nature conservation; biodiversity; agriculture; governance; the Netherlands
1. Introduction
In the past decades, many Western European agricultural landscapes have been transformed with
often detrimental consequences for the abundance and diversity of species. Agricultural intensiﬁca-
tion, for instance, results in increased mechanization, more frequent mowing, increasing livestock
densities, the removal of landscape elements such as hedges and hedgerows, lowering of ground-
water levels, intensiﬁed nitrogen and phosphorus emission and deposition, and intensiﬁed use of
pesticides. These developments in turn contribute to disturbance, loss of habitat, and eventually
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loss in ﬂora and fauna (Baudron & Giller, 2014; EEA, 2010; Geiger, Bengtsson, Berendse, Goed-
hart, & Inchausti, 2010; Henle, Alard, Clitherow, Watt, & Young, 2008; Kleijn, Baquero, Clough,
West, & Yela, 2006; Ollerton, Erenler, Edwards, & Crockett, 2014; Sayer, Sunderland, Ghazoul,
Van Oosten, & Buck, 2013; Stoate, Boatman, Borralho, De Snoo, & Eden, 2001; Van Vliet,
2013; Warren & Bourn, 2011).1 Nowadays, the conservation status of many species and habitats
in agricultural landscapes such as grasslands and croplands is unfavourable (EEA, 2015a).
The trend of continuous intensiﬁcation in Western Europe poses serious challenges to the gov-
ernance of nature conservation in agricultural landscapes, that is, the interventions deliberately
initiated in order to prevent, reduce, or mitigate harmful effects of agriculture on species diversity
and abundance, and to promote positive effects. In many countries, agri-environment schemes
(AES) are implemented for nature conservation by farmers, providing them with publicly
funded ﬁnancial compensation for conservation measures such as reduction in fertilizer and her-
bicides in ﬁeld margins for botanical values, for preserving landscape elements, or for the protec-
tion of speciﬁc species such as meadow birds (Gru¨ebler, Schuler, Horch, & Spaar, 2012). But
there are also private forms of governance of nature conservation by farmers, such as cooperation
between nature conservation NGOs and farmers or biodiversity standards requested by companies
in agricultural supply chains as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility programmes (Curran
& Moran, 2004; Friedmann & McNair, 2008; Penker, Mu¨hlmann, & Muhar, 2014; Targetti,
Herzog, Geijzendorffer, Pointereau, & Viaggi, 2016).
The reported ongoing decline in biodiversity, ﬂora and fauna in agricultural landscapes raises
questions about its governance: what has been achieved thus far and what not (and why), but also
how nature conservation governance can be made more effective. Most studies that address these
questions start from an ecological perspective, for example, evaluate AES on their ecological con-
sequences (e.g. Kleijn et al., 2006) or develop guidelines for conservation management based on
ecological research (e.g. Erisman et al., 2016; Guilherme & Miguel Pereira, 2013; Pelosi,
Bonthoux, Castellarini, Ladet, & Balent, 2014). Fewer studies, however, start from a governance
perspective, that is, focus on the initiatives of, and interactions between, farmers, governments,
and other actors, and how these affect farmers’ choices and behaviour (e.g. Buizer, Arts, & Wes-
terink, 2015; De Snoo, Herzon, Staats, Schwarz, & Musters, 2013; Termeer, Stuiver, Gerritsen, &
Huntjens, 2013). A governance perspective shifts attention away from conservation measures to
behavioural change and to the actors involved and how they interact. Such a perspective also
widens the scope by not only including public policies such as AES but also private initiatives.
Finally, by employing a governance perspective, we will provide insight into the conditions that
affect the performance of nature conservation governance – farmers do not automatically adopt
conservation measures or participate in AES. In this way, our governance perspective comp-
lements an ecological and agronomic perspective.
This paper has four aims. The ﬁrst aim is to explore and analyse distinct ‘governance arrange-
ments’ aimed at promoting nature conservation in agricultural landscapes, that is, particular con-
ﬁgurations of objectives, actors, and their interactions. The second aim is to assess the
performance of these governance arrangements in terms of participation of farmers and nature con-
servation ambition levels. The ecological performance of governance arrangements is outside the
scope of this paper, as this also depends on exogenous factors such as the presence of predators.
The third aim is to understand how arrangements reinforce or weaken other arrangements. The
fourth and ﬁnal aim is to identify the main obstacles involved in nature conservation governance
and explore ways to overcome them. The paper will not analyse in depth why arrangements
have emerged and why they are as they are (see, e.g. Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2010; Feindt, 2010), but
rather how they perform. The empirical focus in this paper is on the Netherlands, where species,
habitats, and biodiversity in agricultural landscapes continue to be threatened (e.g. CBS, 2015;
CBS et al., 2012; EEA, 2015a, 2015b). The Netherlands is an interesting case, because of the
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relatively large population density, a relatively high land use of agriculture (covering over 50% of
the ground surface of the Netherlands (CBS et al., 2015), a relatively long tradition in ﬁnancial com-
pensations for nature conservation measures, and the recent renewal in AES policy of which a larger
responsibility for groups of farmers for achieving results is characteristic.2
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2, we will present our analytical
framework and method. In Section 3, we will analyse and evaluate distinct governance arrange-
ments for nature conservation in Dutch agricultural landscapes. In Section 4, we will wrap up with
our main conclusions and some reﬂections.
2. Analytical framework and method
2.1. Governance and governance arrangements
Governance refers to the ways in which both public and private actors (e.g. companies, NGOs,
and other stakeholders) act and interact in an attempt to solve societal problems (Weber & Chris-
tophersen, 2002). Governance therefore is more than public policy (Driessen, Dieperink, van
Laerhoven, Runhaar, & Vermeulen, 2012; Mol, 2016).
Conceptually, governance can be characterized in terms of ‘arrangements’: particular combi-
nations of objectives, actors, and the ways in which these actors interact and try to inﬂuence each
other. Interactions can be top-down with public authorities in a dominant role; interactive with
public authorities, companies and/or NGOs interacting on a more horizontal level; and bottom-
up with companies, NGOs, and citizens in a leading position (Arts, Leroy, & van Tatenhove,
2006; Hysing, 2009; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998).
In this paper, we will use the framework developed by Driessen et al. (2012), which dis-
tinguishes between ﬁve governance ‘modes’ (see Figure 1; see Supplementary Online Material,
Appendix 1 for a detailed description). We will identify and classify nature conservation govern-
ance arrangements according to the ﬁve ‘modes’. Speciﬁc attention will be paid to the framing of
nature conservation objectives in the arrangements. These objectives can be framed very differ-
ently, as Admiraal, Musters, and de Snoo (2016) show. From environmental governance litera-
ture, we have learnt that environmental issues are more difﬁcult to govern when they are
narrowly deﬁned and not linked to values or objectives in the sectors or practices at issue
(Cashmore & Wejs, 2014; Uittenbroek, Janssen-Jansen, & Runhaar, 2013).
2.2. Evaluating governance arrangements
Governance arrangements will be evaluated in the light of their objectives (cf. Runhaar, Dieper-
ink, & Driessen, 2006; Van Gossum, Arts, & Verheyen, 2012). These objectives will be deﬁned in
terms of the scope of the arrangement (how many farmers are targeted and how many participate
Figure 1. Five modes of governance based on their speciﬁc interaction patterns.
Note: S: state (or public authorities), M: market, CS: civil society; : dominant role; ↔: equivalent role;
2 2 2: background role. Source: Driessen et al. (2012, pp. 146–147).
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in the arrangement?) and in qualitative terms (how ambitious are objectives in terms of the gap
between the objective and the existing situation, or, how difﬁcult is it to achieve the objectives?)
The performance of governance arrangements in terms of the extent to which they contribute
to the achievement of their objectives is assumed to depend on the extent to which they provide
conditions for farmers to participate in the arrangement and incorporate nature conservation in
their practices.3 We assume that four conditions should be provided: farmers should be motivated,
demanded, able, or enabled, and legitimized to participate and act (compare: Hemerijck & Hazeu,
2004). Whether participation subsequently contributes to nature conservation depends not only on
the conditions provided, the ambitions of the governance arrangement, but also on exogenous
factors (e.g. the presence of predators).
The four conditions are derived from various bodies of literature about behavioural change by
farmers or other subjects of environmental governance, and includes literature from policy
sciences, planning, organizational studies, educational studies, management, and social psychol-
ogy (references in the explanation below). Motivation and ability are primarily characteristics of
farmers, whereas demand and legitimation originate from other actors. In addition, motivation and
demand provide reasons for implementing nature conservation measures, whereas ability and
legitimation are facilitating or supporting factors. Figure 2 visualizes this framework.
Motivation to change behaviour (in our case, this means participating in a nature conservation
governance arrangement) is closely related to a sense of ownership of nature conservation (Buizer
et al., 2015; Lokhorst, Staats, van Dijk, & de Snoo, 2011). A demand for sustainable products may
form an external incentive that creates a motivation to change (Mitrokostas & Apostolakis, 2013).
Motivation and ability to change behaviour are often discussed in combination (e.g. Adler&Kwon,
2002). Ability is also often referred to in terms of capacities or capabilities (e.g. Termeer, Dewulf,
Breeman,&Stiller, 2015) and refers to being in possession of resources and skills, needed for nature
conservation. A particular type of resource that is often discussed in literature about nature conser-
vation by farmers is social capital, that is, shared norms and relations of trust among farmers and
other actors as preconditions for cooperation and collective action (Pretty, 2008). In the Nether-
lands, cooperating groups of farmers in so-called environmental cooperatives are often considered
as important for building social capital (e.g. Nieuwenhuizen, Westerink, Gerritsen, Schrijver, &
Salverda, 2014). Social capital not only enables farmers to implement nature conservation
measures but may also motivate them to do so. Demand encompasses (a) an actor who is asking
for behavioural change (e.g. a government or an NGO (representing (parts) of the society)) and
(b) the coerciveness of the request (e.g. a requirement in a contract is more binding and coercive
Figure 2. Conditions for farmers to adopt and implement nature conservation measures.
Source: authors.
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than agreements in a covenant and hence leave less opportunities to avoid or weaken the required
behavioural change) (Mees et al., 2014). Finally, the extent to which behavioural change is legit-
imized has both a legal and a normative dimension (Hemerijck & Hazeu, 2004; Mees et al.,
2014). Legally, governmental regulations may inhibit particular forms of conservation (Buizer
et al., 2015). Normatively, stakeholders may inﬂuencewhat is considered appropriate or acceptable
in terms of production (Hall, Lacey, Carr-Cornish, & Dowd, 2015). The exact meaning and impor-
tance of the governance conditions may vary for different governance arrangements.
The extent to which governance arrangements can provide the four conditions is expected to
depend also on characteristics of the farmers themselves (e.g. intrinsic motivation related to self-
identity) as well as on contextual factors (e.g. physical constraints to the implementation of nature
conservation measures). See Table 1 for an operationalization of the four conditions and how they
may be inﬂuenced by governance arrangements, characteristics of farmers, and contextual factors.
Governance arrangements may be complementary if an arrangement contributes to a con-
dition not addressed by another arrangement (cf. Driessen et al., 2012). Arrangements may
also weaken each other, for example, when top-down regulations limit bottom-up initiatives in
experimenting with new measures for nature conservation (Buizer et al., 2015).
Figure 3 visualizes our analytical framework to identify and classify explanations for the per-
formance of nature conservation arrangements and to identify dilemmas and trade-offs in nature
conservation governance. The arrows represent inﬂuences. In practice, we expect feedback loops
between the elements of the framework; however, these fall outside the scope of this paper and are
therefore disregarded.
2.3. Method, data collection, and analysis
We focus on nature conservation governance arrangements related to dairy farming and arable
farming. These two forms of agriculture encompass the largest share of the total agricultural land-
scape (CBS et al., 2015).
For the identiﬁcation of governance arrangements (ﬁrst research aim), we tapped from our
own knowledge. The author team consists of 10 carefully selected scientists with ecological
and governance expertise regarding nature conservation governance in the Netherlands. Sup-
plementary desk research (formal policy documents, refereed scientiﬁc publications, professional
publications, etc.) was conducted in order to explore other arrangements and to characterize the
arrangements identiﬁed. The focus was on arrangements that have been in use since 2000, in order
to keep the data collection feasible. We identiﬁed a total of 10 typical arrangements.
The assessment of the performance of governance arrangements (second research aim) was
measured against (a) the ambitions of the arrangement at issue regarding scope and quality,
and (b) based on the extent to which these objectives are achieved, based on our assessment of
the four governance conditions. Expert judgement formed the basis of our assessments. Each
author had expertise regarding at least one of the governance arrangements that we identiﬁed.
The assessments were made during two workshops involving the largest part of author team,
which allowed us to evaluate arrangements in a systematic and comparative manner (compare:
Mees et al., 2014). The assessments were the outcomes of a deliberative process, where the
exchange of arguments resulted in a further reﬁnement of indicators and factors affecting con-
ditions (see Table 1). Per arrangement, we started assessing the governance conditions. Sub-
sequently, the performance was assessed. Prior to the workshops, we collected data in order to
inform the assessments from scientiﬁc literature, policy evaluations, and research reports.
Because data quality and availability differed along the arrangements we identiﬁed, we also
used the results from 15 semi-structured interviews with 17 farmers and their representatives
and sector specialists working at universities and research institutes (see Supplementary Online
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Table 1. Operationalization of conditions and examples of factors inﬂuencing them.
Condition Operationalization Factors inﬂuencing conditions
Motivation Extent to which farmers are motivated to participate in a nature
conservation governance arrangement
Governance arrangements
Recognition; rewards; cooperation; degree of autonomy in choosing and implementing
measures; visible results
Context
Cost–beneﬁt ratio of nature conservation measures; place (natural characteristics);
recognition from neighbouring citizens; behaviour by other farmers; social capital; impact
of measures on primary processes; duty
Characteristics of farmers
Values (intrinsic motivation); self-identity (personal drive); education; farming styles and
systems; training and education; interest; enjoyment; satisfaction
Demand Extent to which farmers are requested or even obliged to
participate in a nature conservation governance arrangement
Governance arrangements
Environmental/market regulations; conditions in contracts with customers; pressure from
nature conservation NGOs; consumer strategies
Context
Other policies; public opinion about agriculture (social licence to produce); social capital
Characteristics of farmers
(Religious) values; economic considerations
Ability Extent to which farmers are capable to act within, or enabled to
act by, a nature conservation governance arrangement
Capacity to act: availability of resources and skills for nature
conservation
Governance arrangements
Resources made available (time, money (subsidy; product price), information about beneﬁts
of nature conservation; communities of practice (farmers and others); learning, research
Context
Availability of new business models (e.g. multifunctional agriculture); physical
opportunities or restrictions; market conditions; place (natural characteristics); support
from e.g. NGOs
Characteristics of farmers
Competences; knowledge; farming styles and systems; farm economy; ﬁnance
Legitimacy Extent to which farmers are allowed to participate in, and act
within, a nature conservation governance arrangement
This includes permission to implement nature conservation
measures
Governance arrangements
Degrees of freedom within contracts with customers or in legislation; strictness of legislation
and standards; indirect effects of adjacent policies; framing of agriculture in policy and
communication
Context
Prevailing social norms (‘social licence to operate’); room for manoeuvre in (changing)
legislation
Characteristics of farmers
Norms within the sector (group pressure); cultural setting; social control; innovativeness
Sources: Buizer et al. (2015), Dedeurwaerdere et al. (2016), De Snoo et al. (2013), Driessen (2005), Hall et al. (2015), Horlings (1994), Lokhorst et al. (2011), Meijer, Catacutan, Ajayi,
Sileshi, and Nieuwenhuis (2015), Mitrokostas and Apostolakis (2013), Pretty (2008), Runhaar et al. (2015), Smits, Driessen, and Glasbergen (2008), Van Dijk, Lokhorst, Berendse, and de
Snoo (2015).
6
H
.
A
.
C
.
R
unhaar
et
al.
Material, Appendix 2). Data sources are presented in Supplementary Online Material,
Appendix 3.
The performance and presence of the four governance conditions were assessed on a 3-point
scale (scope: large – moderate – small; quality: high – moderate – low; conditions: high – mod-
erate – low). Also, an indication was given of the variability (high – low).
The analysis of how governance arrangements interact (third research aim) and the identiﬁ-
cation of the main obstacles in the governance of nature conservation in agricultural landscapes
and the exploration of ways to improve existing governance arrangements or develop alternative
arrangements (fourth research aim) were partly based on desk research (e.g. Buizer et al., 2015)
but primarily on our own analysis and discussions during the two workshops.
3. Analysing and evaluating nature conservation governance arrangements
in Dutch agricultural landscapes
In this section, we will discuss governance arrangements for nature conservation in the Nether-
lands, organized according to the ﬁve governance modes described in Section 2.1. We identiﬁed
10 arrangements. The overview is not exhaustive, but encompasses the typical arrangements
identiﬁed within each governance mode. Note that the distinction between governance arrange-
ments is an analytical one – in practice, arrangements sometimes originate from one policy
(e.g. arrangements 2 and 3). Centralized and decentralized governance arrangements are dis-
cussed in combination, because these arrangements started as centralized modes but were gradu-
ally decentralized.
The governance arrangements are brieﬂy characterized and evaluated in Section 3.2. More
detailed analyses can be found in Supplementary Online Material, Appendix 3. Although the
focus is on contemporary arrangements, we will start with a brief history of the governance of
nature conservation in Dutch agricultural landscapes in order to provide the necessary contextual
knowledge.
Figure 3. Analytical framework.
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3.1. Governance of nature conservation in Dutch agricultural landscapes: a brief history
In 1975, the ﬁrst public policy was decided upon that aimed to stimulate farmers to implement
nature conservation measures. Two approaches were taken. One, 100,000 hectares of nature con-
servation area were to be realized by taking agricultural land out of production, to be transferred to
organizations such as the State Forestry Service. These nature reserve areas often have kept the
characteristics of historical agricultural landscapes (and often are farmed out), but with the aim
to preserve associated species. Two, the 1975 policy envisaged another 100,000 hectares of farm-
land where farmers would implement nature conservation measures. From the start, the emphasis
was on conservation of meadow birds. An AES was developed in order to be able to compensate
farmers for the costs for implementing nature conservation measures and for income losses.
These two approaches can be considered as two distinct centralized governance arrangements,
which over time changed into decentralized governance arrangements due to a transfer of respon-
sibilities from state level to provinces (see Section 3.1 and Supplementary Online Material,
Appendix 3).
Due to the lack of success of the 1975 policy – farmers were not much inclined to sell their
lands or to participate in nature management activities – a new, radically different approach to
nature conservation emerged (Arnouts, 2010). Instead of integrating agriculture and nature
conservation, this approach was based on the idea of spatially separating agricultural and
nature areas because of the detrimental effects of modern agricultural on biodiversity (i.e. ‘land
sparing’). Furthermore, the approach focused on the development of new, ‘wild’ nature and the
importance of connecting natural areas. However, instead of replacing the old governance
arrangements of farmed nature reserve areas and AES, the different approaches were merged
in one new Nature policy plan (1990). The plan introduces the concept of an ecological main
infrastructure (EHS), similar to the Natura2000 network in Europe, based on the island biogeo-
graphy theory and the meta-population theory (Jurgens, 1993). The EHS should consist of the
traditionally farmed nature reserve areas, AES areas, other existing nature areas, and 50,000 hec-
tares of new nature area, to be connected via green corridors (Boonstra, 2004).
In spite of the increased government funding, the implementation of the EHS copes with
many the same problems as the 1975 policy. Many farmers still refuse to sell their lands and
are reluctant to engage in AES. In a reaction, in 2000, a new subsidy scheme was implemented
that formally recognizes farmers and private land owners as nature managers and breaks with the
past tradition of transferring agricultural land taken out of production automatically to formal
reserve area management organizations (Arnouts, 2010). However, the concept of the EHS still
remains central to Dutch nature policy.
Next to the above government-led, (de)centralized governance arrangements, other govern-
ance arrangements have emerged around nature conservation in agricultural landscapes.
Farmers have organized themselves into agri-environmental cooperatives since the 1980s but par-
ticularly since the 1990s, partly in response to top-down governance and in an attempt to have
more responsibilities and freedom in implementing nature conservation measures (see Section
3.5). Also other forms of self-governance are observed: for instance, nature conservation
NGOs cooperating with farmers and initiatives from within agri-food supply chains. Below,
we will discuss these and other arrangements in more detail.
3.2. ‘Centralized’ and ‘decentralized’ governance arrangements
We identiﬁed four arrangements that classify as centralized or decentralized governance arrange-
ments. Arrangement 1 consists of the prescribed habitat measures in the greening and cross-com-
pliance conditions to the income support payments of EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
The greening conditions include 5% Ecological Focus Areas for arable farms and maintenance
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of permanent grassland. The cross-compliance conditions include compliance with national and
regional regulations regarding, for instance, the protection of woody landscape elements and
maintenance of ditches (Sanders & Westerink, 2015).4 These regulations promote nature conser-
vation by protecting habitat or by requiring expansion of natural habitat in agricultural landscapes.
Arrangement 2 consists of farmed nature reserve areas: agricultural areas that are bought by the
government with the aim to conserve and protect particular species associated with the traditional
agricultural landscape, for example, meadow birds on grasslands (see Section 3.1). Arrangement
3 is the AES system in its form until 2015. As from 2016, the AES system is substantially revised.
A much larger role now is given to cooperating groups of farmers (‘farmer collectives’). From a
governance perspective, the ‘new style’ AES now classiﬁes as a form of ‘public–private govern-
ance’ (see Section 3.3). Arrangement 4 is the so-called Fauna fund, which compensates farmers
for damage caused by a speciﬁed list of species that are protected or otherwise considered special
species. The spatial distribution of the four arrangements differ, whereas arrangements 1 and 4 in
principle apply to all agricultural landscapes in the Netherlands, arrangements 2 and 3 concentrate
on speciﬁc, designated areas that are interesting from an ecological perspective (e.g. the presence
of relatively large populations of meadow birds).
The main differences between these arrangements relate to the framing of conservation objec-
tives (arrangement 1 focuses on habitat in broad terms, arrangements 2–4 focus on particular
habitats and/or species), the voluntariness of the arrangement (participation is not required in
any arrangement but in arrangement 1, where participation is a condition for income support),
the instruments employed (arrangement 1: legislation and penalties; arrangement 2: legislation,
spatial planning, purchasing, performance agreements, and subsidies; arrangements 3 and 4: pri-
marily subsidies/compensation), and the level of stakeholder autonomy (low only in the case of
arrangement 1). See Supplementary Online Material, Appendix 3, for a more detailed description
and characterization, including an indication of how the arrangements deviate from the ‘ideal
typical’ characterization in the framework by Driessen et al. (2012) (see Figure 1 and Supplemen-
tary Online Material, Appendix 1).
The performance of the arrangements differs. The scope, that is, the share of farmers who are
targeted or participate is moderate in the case of arrangements 1 and 3 and low in arrangements
2 and 4. The quality, that is, ecological ambition levels and the extent to which these are achieved
(‘quality’) shows an opposite picture, which suggests that there is a trade-off between the two per-
formance indicators. Quality is low in the case of arrangement 1 because requirements are either
low or can be implemented ﬂexibly. Ecological effects of AES (arrangement 3) were limited,
mainly because of a low motivation of farmers to choose for measures that were expected to
have a large ecological impact but also would have a substantial impact on farming practices.
For instance, regarding meadow birds, nest protection was relatively often chosen, in contrast
to measures that beneﬁt meadow birds in the chick-rearing phase (Van Vliet, 2013). In nature
reserve areas (arrangement 2) where traditional agricultural landscapes and their associated
species are being maintained, ecological objectives are relatively ambitious. However, even
there, the ecological results have been moderate. For instance, only slightly more than 10% of
grassland reserve areas in the Netherlands meet all the conditions required for the Black-tailed
Godwit (Melman, Teunissen, & Guldemond, 2016b). The Fauna fund (arrangement 2) also has
a moderate performance in terms of quality. Compensation is eligible for a preselected list of
species only and a threshold value is applied. We do not know what share of total damage is
claimed and to what extent farmers take measures themselves to chase animals that cause
damage. We think, however, that most farmers will prefer claiming damage rather than choosing
these alternatives. Illegal killing seems to have been reduced substantially. For example, illegal
killing of Badgers on agricultural ﬁelds has dropped substantially since the 1960s (e.g.
Runhaar, Runhaar, & Vink, 2015) because this is no longer socially acceptable (legitimate).
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The most import indicator is that the favourable conservation status is not in danger, which seems
to be the case for most species in Fauna fund regulations.
For the arrangements 1, 3, and 4, the low-to-moderate performance correlates with a low-to-
moderate motivation of farmers to participate in the arrangements and a moderate-to-low demand
to do so. Legitimacy scores moderate on average; this governance condition does not seem to
form a major obstacle for farmers to participate in (de)centralized governance arrangements.
Ability is assessed as moderate in arrangements 3 and 4, as there are indications that recuperation
of the full costs of nature conservation measures is difﬁcult (which goes at the expense of motiv-
ation). See Supplementary Online Material, Appendix 3 for an elaborated evaluation.
3.3. ‘Public–private’ governance arrangements
Only the revised AES arrangement (arrangement 5) classiﬁes as ‘public–private governance’.
The AES arrangement has been strongly revised in view of its criticized performance. Informed
by scientiﬁc studies (e.g. Kleijn, 2012), various changes have been made which address part but
not all of the criticisms. Nature conservation objectives are still centred round speciﬁc species, but
now limited to species for which the Netherlands bear international responsibility following the
EU Bird and Habitat Directive. Important changes include (a) a stronger focus on ecological ‘core
areas’; (b) a decentralization of contracting responsibilities to the 12 provinces; and (c) the
required organization of farmers into 40 ‘farmer collectives’ that develop and propose bids to
the provinces and that are responsible for contracting farmers and for enforcing contracts. Partici-
pation by farmers, however, is still voluntary. Compensations remain to be the main instrument.
Yet, mainly due to the new contracting relationships (which provide cooperatives a larger degree
of freedom in developing plans), the arrangement now (predominantly) classiﬁes as public–
private (see Supplementary Online Material, Appendix 3, Table A3).
The arrangement went into force on 1 January 2016. In view of the changes made as compared
to the old system and how that was evaluated (see Supplementary Online Material, Appendix 3,
Table A2), we expect that the performance of the ‘new style’ AES will be slightly higher than the
old AES, not in terms of scope but in terms of quality. This is partly explained by a stricter focus
on areas that are promising from an ecological perspective (making this arrangement a bit more
demanding), and partly because we expect a slight increase in motivation to participate and con-
tribute to conservation objectives.
3.4. ‘Interactive’ governance arrangements
We identiﬁed two arrangements that ﬁt within the ‘interactive governance mode’ category.
Arrangement 6 consists of place-based partnerships between farmers, agri-environmental coop-
eratives (groups of farmers; see under arrangement 8), nature conservation or landscape restor-
ation NGOs, local and provincial governments, and other stakeholders within a particular
region. Often, these partnerships are initiated by NGOs, agri-environmental cooperatives, or
local or provincial governments. The partnerships are characterized by their regional scope and
bottom-up way of working. Government involvement at the state level is usually limited to
funding. Goals are formulated in a broad, integrated way, and include landscape quality, biodiver-
sity, recreational access, cultural artefacts, and nature conservation. In Supplementary Online
Material, Appendix 3, we discuss a partnership in detail, as an example. In this example,
nature conservation is framed as ‘green and blue services’ provided by farmers. In this partnership
and in several other partnerships that were initiated as pilot projects experiments, the aim was to
develop landscape elements covering about 5% of the ﬁelds, ideally combined with recreational
measures, as part of a spatial landscape development plan.
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Arrangement 7 is the so-called ‘Farming for nature’ arrangement. Participating farmers trans-
formed their farming practices into an extensive form of farming, in which nature conservation
was one of the objectives (in addition to landscape quality, water quality, and recreation). The
underlying concept was developed by researchers. Nature conservation was framed in general
terms: biodiversity was an explicit aim, but no speciﬁc (group of) species were targeted. The
farming practices were inspired on the conditions that resulted in the biodiverse agricultural land-
scapes of the recent past. As a result of broad partnerships of farmers, citizens, governmental
actors, and researchers, four ‘pilot projects’ were started in which the farmers involved trans-
formed their farming practices according to Farming for nature principles. Subsidies required
to ﬁnance the transformation were provided by the governmental actors; however, because of
EU state aid regulations, the funding was limited to only four farmers.
Both arrangements are found in areas with particular ecological or landscape values. They
perform moderately in terms of quality (i.e. nature conservation ambitions) because nature con-
servation is only part of broader sustainability objectives. In the case of place-based partnerships,
variability in quality is high; some partnerships do well, whereas others have failed. In Online
Supplementary Material, Appendix 3, we discuss a successful partnership that resulted in the cre-
ation of new biotopes that attracted new rare animal and plant species. The performance of both
interactive governance arrangements in terms of scope is low, in particular, for arrangement 7
because only a few pilots were allowed. Motivation and demand to participate in these arrange-
ments score moderately (arrangement 6) to low (arrangement 7). For the arrangement 7, legiti-
macy formed an important bottleneck: state aid regulations restricted participation in this
arrangement to only four farmers. Ability scores moderate to high, mainly depending on the
funding available (which in turn inﬂuences motivation).
3.5. ‘Self-governance’ arrangements5
Already in the 1980s but particularly during the last 15 years, self-governance has emerged as a
new form of rural governance. Agri-environmental cooperatives are one of the ﬁrst manifestations
(Termeer et al., 2013; Wiskerke, Bock, Stuiver, & Renting, 2003). These arrangements classify as
self-governance in terms of Driessen et al. (2012) because they are initiated by private actors
(farmers, companies, NGOs, and sometimes citizens), which operate autonomously and partly
based on informal rules.
Agri-environmental cooperatives (ECs) – arrangement 8 – started because participating
farmers wanted to be more responsible themselves to realize environmental objectives and, in
a later stage, for nature conservation and landscape restoration objectives. Their work related
to nature conservation includes supporting farmers in applications and reporting for AES, promot-
ing regional cooperation (which may help in coordinating conservation activities), knowledge
dissemination and training, recruiting farmers to participate, and acquiring funding for landscape
restoration. In 2015, about 150–160 ECs existed, distributed over the Netherlands.
In the current system of AES, part of the tasks of agri-environmental cooperatives have been
taken over by the farmer collectives who implement parts of the AES, and form a compulsory
element in the Dutch AES. Some of these farmer collectives are mergers of agri-environmental
cooperatives; others are newly established as partnership of several agri-environmental coopera-
tives that continue to exist. Therefore, agri-environmental cooperatives are nested in and have
founded the farmer collectives.
Another form of self-governance is cooperation between nature conservation NGOs and indi-
vidual farmers (arrangement 9). NGOs such as Birdlife Netherlands aim to support farmers to
implement conservation measures for speciﬁc species by means of knowledge and advice, acqui-
sition of funding, and the development of new business models (e.g. direct sale of dairy products).
International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 11
A more recent form of self-governance is what we label ‘supply chain governance’ (arrange-
ment 10): processors and other companies involved in agri-food chains that demand more sustain-
able farming, which includes, but is not restricted to, nature conservation and restoration. One
example is a large dairy processor to which a majority of dairy farmers deliver and that is devel-
oping sustainability criteria (which includes participation in AES as a speciﬁc criterion). Farmers
who comply with sustainability criteria receive a surplus on their products, which is ‘paid for’ by
non-participating farmers (bonus-malus). Another example is a large bank, where a majority of
farmers have loans and mortgages, and that is considering a similar system; farmers who
comply with sustainability receive discounts on their loans. An initiative which has existed for
almost 10 years started with a bonus-malus system but faced large resistance among farmers;
this system therefore is downscaled. Knowledge dissemination nowadays is the main instrument
employed within this initiative.
Most supply chain governance initiatives are in development and not fully implemented.
Because they represent a new form of steering nature conservation in agricultural landscapes,
we have included them in our analysis. Because of their broad objectives, these arrangements
do not focus on speciﬁc regions (e.g. with particular landscape or ecological values), in contrast
to, for example, AES (arrangements 3 and 5).
The (expected) performance of the above self-governance arrangements differs substantially.
The scope of arrangements 8 and 9 is moderate and small, respectively. About 10% of all farmers
participate in ECs, although there are regions where a majority of farmers participate. For NGO–
farmer cooperation (arrangement 9), participation by farmers is low because NGOs have limited
capacity to engage with many farmers. The scope of arrangement 10 is expected to differ, but for
some initiatives, the potential scope is large; this applies to the two examples described above.
The performance in terms of quality is moderate in the case of arrangement 9 (NGO–individual
farmer cooperation). This arrangement focuses on speciﬁc species. Only anecdotal evidence is
available. For instance, BirdLife Netherlands states that their cooperation with farmers has con-
tributed to an increase in numbers of Barn Owls from about 100 pairs in the 1970s to about 3000
nowadays. The quality of the other two arrangements is expected to be low because usually nature
conservation is only one of the aims of these arrangements and we have seen no signs of very high
nature conservation ambitions.
Motivation to participate in self-governance arrangements 8 and 9 is moderate to low, which is
mainly explained by a lack of structural funding of nature conservation measures. Motivation to
participate in supply chain governance arrangements (arrangement 10) is not clear yet, because
many initiatives are in development. If the market-based instruments that are intended to be
employed (bonus-malus) are sufﬁciently attractive for farmers, motivation to participate in
these arrangements may be high. Legitimacy does not seem to form a major bottleneck for
farmers to participate. Although ability does not score low overall, ﬁnding income sources to
recover the costs for nature conservation measures is reported to be difﬁcult. As stated above,
this also is found to inﬂuence motivation negatively. For a detailed description, we again refer
to Supplementary Online Material, Appendix 3.
4. Discussion and conclusions
The aim of this paper was to explore and analyse the various ways in which nature conservation in
agricultural landscapes is governed, to elucidate the potential as well as limitations of these
governance arrangements individually and in combination, and to explore ways to overcome
constraints. Below, we will discuss our ﬁndings and reﬂect on the limitations of the study
(Section 4.1) as well as on the research questions (Section 4.2).
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4.1. Discussion
In this paper, we analysed and evaluated governance arrangements that promote nature conserva-
tion by farmers, focusing on the last 15 years. We identify three limitations of our study. One,
because we focused on typical arrangements in terms of the Driessen et al. (2012) framework dis-
cussed in Section 2.1, our overview is not complete; not all individual arrangements with their
own peculiarities were mentioned. Our paper does, however, represent the most distinct arrange-
ments. Two, expert judgement was used as a means for evaluation, as far as possible supported by
ﬁndings from earlier studies and by supplementary interviews. The evaluation therefore is quali-
tative in nature. It nevertheless allowed us to evaluate the 10 arrangements in a systematic and
comparable way, to compare them, and to identify limitations of governance arrangements.
Further evaluations at the level of individual arrangements are required to obtain more quantitat-
ive assessments. Such evaluations could also highlight differences between (groups of) farmers;
for instance, motivation to participate in nature conservation arrangements may be different
among organic farmers. Three, the analysis of how governance arrangements interact focuses
on performance, not on the very emergence of arrangements. As Section 3.1 showed, also
other types of interactions between governance arrangements exist; for instance, many arrange-
ments emerged in response to dissatisfaction with existing ones. A more detailed analysis in
that area, however, was beyond the scope of this paper.
The analytical framework we employed assumed that nature conservation by farmers is not
only a matter of motivation. Nature conservation governance arrangements should also enable,
legitimize, and demand farmers to participate and act. At ﬁrst sight, Table 2 does not show a
clear pattern regarding the extent to which governance arrangements provide the conditions we
expected to be of importance (see Section 2.2) and the performance of governance arrangements
(either in terms of scope or in terms of quality, given the apparent trade-off we discussed above).
When we focus on performance in terms of scope, we observe that the best-performing arrange-
ments (1 and 10) are those that are (potentially) the most demanding (i.e. that strongly coerce
many farmers to participate), and those that score well on the conditions of motivation, ability,
and legitimacy (arrangements 3, 5, and 8). Arrangements that have low scores on both ‘motiv-
ation’ and ‘demand’ (7 and 9) also have a low performance. For arrangements 2 and 4, relation-
ships are less clear, but here the low performance in terms of scope is explained by the ambitions
of the arrangement itself (total size of nature reserve areas that can be farmed out is small and the
Fauna fund only compensates damage for a limited list of species and employs a threshold value).
Arrangement 6 (place-based partnerships) has high variance in scores on conditions and perform-
ance, so that there are no clear conclusions possible for this arrangement. Given that bottom-up
initiatives in nature conservation in general is gaining in importance (Mattijssen, Buijs, Elands, &
van Dam, 2015), and that some perform high in terms of quality (but some not), it is interesting to
examine the performance of this arrangement in more detail.
4.2. Conclusions
Research question 1: How is nature conservation governed in agricultural landscapes?
A total of 10 distinct governance arrangements for promoting nature conservation by farmers
were identiﬁed. This inventory conﬁrms that employing a governance ‘lens’ indeed broadens per-
spectives. One out of the 10 arrangements is predominantly based on the principle of land sparing
(arrangement 2, nature reserve areas); all others are on the principle of land sharing. Nature con-
servation objectives are framed differently across governance arrangements: some arrangements
focus on speciﬁc species, others on nature conservation in broader terms, and sometimes, nature
conservation is embedded in a more general effort to contribute to more sustainable agriculture
and to landscape restoration.
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Table 2. Overall evaluation.
(De)centralized governance Public–private
governance
Interactive governance Self-governance
Arr. 1:
Prescribed
habitat
measures
Arr. 2:
Farmed
nature
reserve areas
Arr. 3: AES
(until 2015)
Arr. 4:
Fauna fund
Arr. 5: ‘New
style’ AES
(as from 2016)
Arr. 6: Place-
based
partnerships
Arr. 7:
Farming for
Nature
Arr. 8: Agri-
environmental
cooperatives
(until 2015)
Arr. 9: NGO-
individual
farmer
cooperation
Arr. 10: Supply
chain
governance
Characteristics
Framing of
nature
conservation
General
requirements
regarding
habitat
Both speciﬁc
species and
habitat types
Both speciﬁc
species and
habitat types
Speciﬁc
species
Both speciﬁc
species and
habitat types
Speciﬁc
species, or
nature
conservation as
part of a broader
set of objectives
Nature
conservation
part of a
broader set of
objectives
Very different
across ECs,
usually only one
aspect of broader
set of objectives
Speciﬁc species Nature
conservation as
part of a broader
set of objectives
Steering
philosophy
Regulations
and penalties
Zoning,
farming out
contracts,
compensation
Voluntary
cooperation,
compensation
Voluntary
cooperation,
compensation
Voluntary
cooperation,
contracting/
negotiations,
compensation
Voluntary
cooperation,
negotiation
about
objectives,
compensation
and support
Initiated by
researchers and
farmers,
voluntary
cooperation and
intensive
(ﬁnancial)
support;
allowed as pilot
Initiated by
farmers,
voluntary
cooperation,
compensation and
support
Initiated by
NGOs,
voluntary
cooperation,
support by
acquisition of
funding and
knowledge;
knowledge
sharing among
participating
farmers
Initiated by
‘upstream’
companies;
bonus-malus
system, based on
compliance with
sustainability
criteria;
voluntary
participation
Geographical
focus
No speciﬁc
geographical
focus
Speciﬁc areas,
interesting
from an
ecological
perspective
Speciﬁc areas,
interesting
from an
ecological
perspective
No speciﬁc
geographical
focus
Speciﬁc areas,
interesting
from an
ecological
perspective
Speciﬁc areas,
interesting from
a landscape/
ecological
perspective
Speciﬁc areas,
interesting from
a landscape/
ecological
perspective
No speciﬁc
geographical
focus (but
participation
differs
substantially; see
under Scope)
Speciﬁc areas,
interesting from
an ecological
perspective
No speciﬁc
geographical
focus
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Performance
Scope Moderate
(var.: low)
Small
(var.: high)
Moderate
(var.: low)
Small
(var.: high)
Moderate
(var.: low)
Small
(var.: low)
Small
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: high)
Small
(var.: unknown)
Unknown but
potentially large
(var.: high)
Quality Low
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: high)
Low
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: high)
Moderate
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: high)
Moderate
(var.: low)
Low
(var.: unknown)
Moderate
(var.: unknown)
Probably low
(var.: unknown)
Governance conditions
Motivation Low
(var.: high)
High
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: high)
Low
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: high)
Low
(var.: unknown)
Not clear yet
(var.: unknown)
Demand Moderate
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: low)
Low
(var.: low)
Low
(var.: low)
Low-moderate
(var.: high)
Low
(var.: low)
Low
(var.: high)
Low
(var.: high)
Low
(var.: low)
Potentially high
(var.: high)
Ability High
(var.: low)
High
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: high)
Moderate
(var.: high)
Moderate
(var.: high)
Moderate
(var.: high)
High
(var.: high)
Moderate
(var.: high)
High
(var.: high)
Unknown
(var.: unknown)
Legitimacy High
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: high)
Moderate
(var.: high)
Moderate
(var.: high)
High
(var.: low
Low
(var.: low)
Moderate
(var.: low)
High
(var.: low)
Unknown
(var.: unknown)
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Research question 2: Potential and limitations of governance arrangements
Table 2 summarizes the performance of the 10 arrangements. As explained in Section 2.2, we
distinguish between two performance criteria: scope and quality. Regarding the ﬁrst criterion, our
judgement is that a low-to-moderate number of farmers participate in each of the 10 arrangements.
Arrangements each attract a maximum of 5–10% of all farmers covering 20–25% of all farmland
(but usually less). Arrangement 10 potentially has a larger scope in terms of participating farmers,
but most initiatives within this arrangement are ‘under construction’. The arrangements in paral-
lel may target a large number of farmers and hence have a large scope. However, we cannot esti-
mate how large that share of farms could be, because from our experience, we know that many
farmers participate in multiple arrangements. This ‘overlap’ exists because many (but not all) gov-
ernance arrangements are found in, or focus on, areas with particular ecological or landscape
values (see Sections 3.2–3.5); this is the case only in part of the agricultural landscapes.
In terms of quality, the performance of the 10 arrangements is low-to-moderate. Table 2
suggests that at the level of individual arrangements, a trade-off between scope and quality
exists, except for arrangement 5 (‘new style’ AES). From the analyses in Supplementary
Online Material, Appendix 3, this is explained by the observation that ‘shallow’ nature conserva-
tion measures are easier to integrate in farming practices than more profound ones that more sub-
stantially contribute to nature conservation (e.g. higher water tables) but that also have major
repercussions for farming practices (cf. Westerink, Melman, & Schrijver, 2015).
Few arrangements score high on the condition of ‘ability’. From the more detailed evaluations
in Supplementary Online Material, Appendix 3, it becomes clear that a major bottleneck to par-
ticipate in nature conservation governance arrangements seems to be covering the costs of imple-
menting conservation measures. Financial compensation or other forms of funding therefore seem
an important precondition not only for ability, but also for motivation (see Supplementary Online
Material, Appendix 3, arrangements 6–10). Payment can come not only from government sub-
sidies, but also from private actors. It is unclear to what extent Dutch consumers are willing to
pay for nature conservation by farmers. In a survey among over 1000 citizens, Langers and
Goossen (2014) found that only a small share of citizens states to be willing to pay or to
support farmers in other ways (see Figure 4).6 This also seems to inhibit, for instance, dairy pro-
ducers to introduce ‘biodiverse’ dairy products on the market (interviewee 10).
Figure 4. Willingness of Dutch citizens to cooperate with initiatives that aim to protect meadow birds.
Source: Langers and Goossen (2014, p. 18).
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Based on literature referred to in Section 2.1, we expected that the framing of nature conser-
vation objectives would inﬂuence the ease with which they could be governed. Indeed, it seems
logical that the more speciﬁc these objectives are, the more speciﬁc associated nature conserva-
tion measures are, which in turn are more difﬁcult to integrate in farming practices. This then
should become particularly evident in low scores on the governance conditions of ‘motivation’
and ‘ability’ for arrangements that have speciﬁc objectives (arrangements 2–5 and 9). Table 2,
however, does not suggest that there is such a clear correlation. The more detailed evaluations
in Supplementary Online Material, Appendix 3 show that relationships between the framing of
nature conservation objectives, conditions provided by arrangements, and the expected perform-
ance of the arrangements are more complex in that respect.
Research question 3: Interaction between governance arrangements
In some cases, synergies between governance arrangements were observed. For instance, the
farmer collectives from ‘new style’ AES (arrangement 5) are often based on environmental coop-
eratives (arrangement 8) that merged into these collectives in order to be eligible for funding for
AES. Farmers who participated in ECs are therefore expected to be motivated to also participate
in AES. In addition, being invited by collective to participate may motivate more than a ‘distant’
subsidy call (Prager, 2015). In addition, place-based partnerships (arrangement 6) and environ-
mental cooperatives (arrangement 8) are based on, or facilitate, AES (arrangements 3 and 5);
here, arrangements complement each other by enabling farmers to participate in the other arrange-
ment (‘ability’ condition). Some initiatives in supply chain governance (arrangement 10) reward
participating farmers who also participate in AES (enhancing motivation to continue doing so or
start doing so). Supply chain governance arrangements are still in development, but if powerful
companies in agri-food chains set stricter demands regarding sustainability and nature conserva-
tion, and taking conservation measures hence becomes a less voluntary activity, this may motivate
farmers to participate in other governance arrangements.7
We also observe a conﬂict between governance arrangements. The legitimacy of the Farming
for Nature arrangement (arrangement 7) was negatively inﬂuenced by centralized governance
arrangements that did not focus on nature conservation directly but indirectly through state aid
regulations (see Supplementary Online Material, Appendix 3; see also Buizer et al., 2015).
Research question 4: Main obstacles in the governance of nature conservation in agricultural
landscapes and ways to overcome these
This paper started with the observation that trends in the conservation status of many species
and habitats and in biodiversity in Dutch agricultural landscapes are unfavourable. We identiﬁed
and assessed 10 distinct governance arrangements that aim to promote nature conservation by
farmers. Although a large part of farmers participate in these arrangements, apparently this is
not enough to halt the decline in ﬂora and fauna caused by the trend towards further intensiﬁcation
of agricultural practices. The intensiﬁcation is incentivized by other forms of governance, such as
the CAP and requirements from within agri-food chains (see, e.g. Sanderson, Kucharz, Jobda, &
Donald, 2013). Effective nature conservation on Dutch agricultural landscapes hence should also
be promoted by these other forms of governance. In other words, nature conservation should be
mainstreamed or integrated in other, non-nature conservation governance arrangements that target
agriculture. We observe some cautious, ﬁrst steps in that direction. The greening requirements in
the CAP (arrangement 1) but also initiatives within agri-food chains (e.g. arrangement 10) poten-
tially target large groups of farmers (‘scope’), although thus far nature conservation ambitions are
low (‘quality’). Mainstreaming nature conservation in agricultural policies and governance may
also positively inﬂuence participation in nature conservation governance arrangements.
We have no immediate solutions how to stimulate the further mainstreaming of nature con-
servation in agricultural policy and agri-supply chains, but suggest three lines of further
inquiry. One, a further analysis of the driving forces of agricultural intensiﬁcation – who beneﬁts
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from further intensiﬁcation and how can a reconciliation of agricultural practices and nature con-
servation be (made) proﬁtable for these actors? Two, an exploration of how citizens’ awareness of
the ecological consequences of agricultural intensiﬁcation can be raised, in order to stimulate a
further ‘greening’ of the CAP. Three, an analysis of how consumers’ willingness to pay for
agri-food that is produced in ways that promote nature conservation can be increased, in order
to increase market potential for ‘nature-friendly’ food.
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Notes
1. In some cases, opposite effects are observed. For instance, species such as meadow birds beneﬁt from
the removal of hedges (Besnard & Secondi, 2014).
2. For data about the Dutch agricultural sector, see www.agrimatie.nl/Default.aspx.
3. A variety of frameworks are available for evaluating governance arrangements. Some take the arrange-
ment itself as the starting point and assess, for instance, resources and capacities of governing actors.
Others focus on the problem at issue and explore the extent to which all of its causes and effects are
targeted. We start from the farmers and the incentives they are exposed to, which enables the identiﬁ-
cation of their (and other stakeholders’) concerns about the feasibility and possible side effects of gov-
ernance arrangements. With that, an important criticism of objectives-based evaluation is overcome;
namely that target groups are largely ignored (Fischer, 1997; Verschuren & Zsolnai, 1998; Austin,
Penic, Raffaelli, & White, 2015; Runhaar et al., 2006, 2016). The framework we developed is inspired
by the literature that we cite but also by other frameworks, among which the ‘four key questions for
policy design’ framework developed by Van Hemerijck and Hazeu (2004). That framework,
however, is broader than ours, as it focuses not only on evaluating policy outcomes, but also on the
policy-making process. At the same time, it is more limited in scope than ours because it only
focuses on policy and ignores other forms of governance.
4. In the Netherlands, also at the provincial level, habitat requirements apply, but in this paper, we will
focus on the CAP in order not to confuse the reader; the aim of the paper is to discuss the typical arrange-
ments in terms of the Driessen et al. (2012) framework, not to discuss all arrangements.
5. We ignore farmers who implement nature conservation measures voluntarily. It is not known how many
farmers do so, but there is some anecdotal evidence; many farmers have next boxes for owls and other
predatory birds and many allow swallows and other birds to breed in their barns. Also it seems there is
more tolerance towards animals that forage and cause damage than in the past (e.g. Runhaar et al.,
2015). This form of self-governance was ignored because conservation measures are usually taken at
farmyards and not at the ﬁeld level, which means that the nature conservation gains are generally
limited.
6. The low willingness to pay may be related to difﬁculties consumers face in recognizing products that are
produced in ways that incorporate nature conservation (Sanders & Westerink, 2015; interviewee 8; 12)
and in part because large part of agri-food products are exported (interviewee 11; 13). A related problem
is that it seems more difﬁcult to change the perception of Dutch citizens about the agricultural land-
scapes; many Dutch citizens are found to have an idealized picture of these landscapes in mind, rich
in terms of nature and landscape values, despite changes in agricultural practices such as intensiﬁcation
which have negatively impacted upon these values (Steenbekkers, Simon, Vermeij, & Spreeuwers,
2008).
7. As we stated in the Introduction to this paper, we do not focus on the emergence of governance arrange-
ments, although also in this respect interactions exist; for example, without regulation, the ECs probably
would not have emerged (see also Section 3.1).
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